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QuenchWorks

vcluster

Image · CI/CD & registry · standard · v0.37.3

D 8cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-06

vCluster, virtual Kubernetes clusters that run inside a namespace of a host cluster. The syncer is built from source (CGO off, floated modules); the control plane it runs, kube-apiserver and kube-controller-manager 1.36.4 built from the Kubernetes tag with kine on SQLite, ships in the same image, so no initContainer copies binaries in.

Version

0.37.3 · latest0.36.30.35.4

The latest line lives at the base page; older lines have their own page so you can pin and verify exactly that version.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:e789c5e693fc31035488c5efb5b57ea168868dc52eab59dd8c7cd2fd2cbfec43

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Image
ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vcluster:0.37.3
Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
112.9 MB

Published versions

3 tags

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
0.37.3latest112.9 MB2026-10-06sha256:e789c5e693fc…
0.36.3112.7 MB2026-10-06sha256:146227a690ed…
0.35.4112.7 MB2026-10-06sha256:8d47f660177a…

Security report (Trivy)

D· 66/1008 open · no upstream fix yet

Vulnerability detail

vcluster 0.37.3 · 4 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
CVE-2026-41567HIGHgithub.com/docker/dockerv28.5.2+incompatible— not fixabledocker: Moby/Docker Engine: Arbitrary Code Execution via malicious container image and compressed archive upload
CVE-2026-42306HIGHgithub.com/docker/dockerv28.5.2+incompatible— not fixablegithub.com/docker/docker: github.com/moby/moby: Moby container framework: Host file overwrite via race condition in docker cp mount setup
CVE-2026-41568MEDIUMgithub.com/docker/dockerv28.5.2+incompatible— not fixablegithub.com/docker/docker: github.com/moby/moby: Moby: Denial of Service via race condition in docker cp mount setup
GO-2026-5932UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/cryptov0.56.0— not fixableThe golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unmaintained, unsafe by design, and has known security issues
0
Critical
2
High
1
Medium
0
Low
5
Unknown

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vcluster:0.37.3

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vcluster@sha256:e789c5e693fc31035488c5efb5b57ea168868dc52eab59dd8c7cd2fd2cbfec43

Tags

0.37.30.37.3-amd640.37.3-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
0.37.3
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
Apache-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vcluster:0.37.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vcluster:0.37.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/vcluster:0.37.3 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

View the Helm chartView package

Upstream project: https://github.com/loft-sh/vcluster